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those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.The main instrument of monetary policy is the short term nominal interest rate.
Standard analyses of monetary policy focus on modeling the link between this interest rate
and the rest of the macroeconomy. Here we document two regularities about the behavior of
short and long term interest rates and the macroeconomy that point to key failings of current
approaches to modeling monetary policy. We argue that to account for these regularities one
must address central questions about the links between monetary policy and the economy
that are not addressed successfully in standard monetary models. We are led to call for a
new approach to analyzing monetary policy.
Our ﬁrst regularity concerns the changing behavior of long term and short term nomi-
nal interest rates, referred to as long and short rates, observed in the long run historical data.
Most economists are familiar with the observation that long and short rates move closely
together, at least at low frequencies, for much of the post World War II period. What we
ﬁnd striking is that this pattern is found only in this post war data. In the pre-World War II
data, in the United States and in many of the countries in Europe, long rates were smooth
even when short rates were highly volatile. In addition, at least in the United States, we
ﬁnd evidence that after 1990 long rates and short rates seem to be returning to the prewar
pattern.
Standard theory based on the expectations hypothesis links movements in long rates
to movements in agents’ expectations of averages of future short rates over the long term. We
argue, on the basis of the recent work of Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) that, at least at low
frequencies, the expectations hypothesis is a useful characterization of the data: movements
in long rates do correspond mainly to movements in agents’ expectations of averages of future
short rates over the long term.
In light of this theory and these empirical results, we see two regimes in these low
frequency data on short and long rates: a stable regime in which agents have stable long
term expectations of short rates and a volatile regime in which agents have volatile long term
expectations of short rates. The stable regime was in place in many countries for over 100
years prior to World War II. During this regime, it appears that agents’ expectations of the
average level of the short rate over the long term were ﬁrmly anchored. After World War
II these countries switched to the volatile regime as early as the 1950s. During this period,it appears that agents’ long run expectations became unanchored – it appears that agents
interpreted most of the higher frequency movements in the short rate as nearly permanent
changes in policy. Finally, data post 1990 suggests that at least the United States has switched
back to a stable regime – perhaps agents’ long run expectations may be anchored again.
These data on the changing behavior of long and short rates then raise a central
question about monetary policy: What change in policy and institutions led to these changes
in regimes? We argue that existing analyses of the post World War II data cannot account
for the behavior of long term interest rates observed during that time period. Because these
existing models fail to account for the volatility of agents’ long run expectations observed over
this time period, we are skeptical of the usefulness of these models for analyzing this central
question about the design of monetary policy and monetary institutions. A new approach is
needed.
Our second regularity concerns the comovements in the short rate and the macro-
economy at business cycle frequencies. Empirical work in ﬁnance indicates that at business
cycle frequencies it is risk that moves when the short rate moves. This result is derived from
regressions that show that the risk premium on long term bonds moves more than one-for-one
with the yield spread between the long and the short rate.
Is this empirical work in ﬁnance a problem for standard analyses of monetary policy
at business cycle frequencies? We argue that the answer is yes. Standard monetary models
rule out movements in risk premia by assumption. Instead, in these models movements in the
short rate, by assumption, correspond through the consumption Euler equation to movements
in the expected growth in the marginal utility of consumption and expected inﬂation. This
assumption is a serious failing of these models. In the data, movements in the expected growth
in the marginal utility of consumption and expected inﬂation as computed from estimates of
a standard model account for virtually none of the movements in the short rate observed at
business cycle frequencies. We look to the empirical work in ﬁnance on time varying risk as
oﬀering the best answer to the question of what in the macroeconomy moves when the short
rate moves? It is risk.
These data on the comovement of risk and the short rate at business cycle frequencies
then raise a second central question about monetary policy and the macroeconomy: Is the Fed
2changing the short rate to passively accommodate changes in risk? Or does the Fed change
risk when it changes the short rate? Until we can answer this question about the direction of
causation, we cannot address key counterfactual questions about what would have happened
to the macroeconomy if policy had been diﬀerent. Since standard monetary models rule
out time varying risk by assumption, they cannot be used to address these counterfactual
questions. A new approach is needed.
We present our two regularities in the next section. In section 3, we interpret our
ﬁrst regularity in light of standard theory and argue empirically that movements in the long
rate correspond mainly to movements in agents’ expectations of long run averages of the
future short rate, at least at low frequencies. In section 4, we interpret our second regularity
in light of standard theory and review the failings of standard monetary models to account
for movements in the short rate at business cycle frequencies. In section 5 we discuss our
two regularities in light of the current frontier analyses of monetary policy. In section 6 we
conclude.
1. Long and Short Term Rates
In this section we document the two regularities in the data on long and short term
interest rates that we discuss in this paper. We consider a decomposition of the short rate it
into the sum of a long rate yL
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Our ﬁrst empirical regularity concerns how the relative importance of ﬂuctuations in the long
rate and ﬂuctuations in the yield spread in accounting for ﬂuctuations in the short rate have
changed over time. We document this regularity in three time periods examining the data
post World-War II, pre World-War II, and post 1990. The second regularity concerns how
risk moves with the term spread.
Fact 1A. After World War II, long rates are volatile relative to short rates
In Figure 1 we present our decomposition (1) of the short rate into the two components
of the long rate and the yield spread for the post - World War II period in the United States.
For the short rate we use the 3-month U.S. Tbill yield and for the long rate we use the yield
on a 13-year zero coupon U.S. Treasury bond. For the period 1946:12 to 1991:2 we use the
3data from McCulloch and Kwon (1991) for both series. For the period 1991:3 to 2007:12 we
use CRISP for the 3-month Tbill and Gurkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2006) for the 13-year
zero coupon bond. In this ﬁgure we see that the vast bulk of the movements in the short rate
correspond to movements in the long rate and only a small portion of the movements in the
short rate correspond to movements in the yield spread. Using data from 1947 to 2007 we
compute a variance decomposition which conﬁrms that ﬂuctuations in the long rate account
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We note that our decomposition in Figure 1 is not that sensitive to the choice of the
long rate or the choice of the short rate. We chose to use the yield on a 13 year zero coupon
bond as our measure of the long rate because that is the longest yield available for the whole
postwar sample in our data set. In Figure 2 we plot the yields on 13 year, 23 year, and 30
year zero coupon bonds for the dates at which these series are available1. We see that yields
on these diﬀerent bonds are remarkably similar where they overlap.
Following the suggestions in Piazzesi (2003) pages 41-43, we have chosen the 3 month
Tbill rate as our measure of the short rate. In Figure 3 we plot the 3 month Tbill rate
together with the Federal Funds target rate, which starts only in 1982. We see that these
two series track each other closely over the period where they overlap.
Fact 1B. Before World War II, long rates are not volatile relative to short rates.
In Figure 4A we graph a short rate and a long rate for the United States from
1835 through the present. For the short rate we use the US 3-month Commercial Paper
rate and for the long rate we use the yield on a 10 year U.S. Treasury bond (available at
www.globalﬁnancialdata.com.). Clearly, in the pre-World War II period, ﬂuctuations in the
long rate are a much smaller component of overall ﬂuctuations in the short rate than they are
in the post-World War II period. In particular, in the data from 1835 to 1939 our variance
1Up to 1991:2 these series are McCulloch and Kwon (1991) and from 1991:3 they are from Gurkaynak,
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This diﬀerence in pre- and post-war behavior of long and short rates is also evident
in the data for of a large number of countries, including the United Kingdom (Figure 4B),
France (Figure 4C), Germany (Figure 4D), and the Netherlands (Figure 4E).
Fact 1C. Post 1990, the relative volatility of long and short interest rates has declined.
In Figure 1 we can clearly see two episodes since 1990 in which the Fed has engineered
a persistent dip in short rates without corresponding ﬂuctuations in long rates. (The Fed may
well be starting a third persistent dip in short rates starting in early 2008.) This apparent
change in the relative volatility of long and short rates can be seen in our decomposition if we
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0.55 + 0.68 − 0.23.
Here we see that relative variances of the long and the short has decreased from nearly
1 (.98) in the ﬁrst part of the sample to only about 1/2 (.55) in the later part of the sample.
While this change in the relative volatility of the long and short rates in the data post 1990
5is not as obvious as it is in the pre World-War II data, it is suggestive that the behavior of
short and long rates has changed in this more recent period.
We are not the only researchers who have noticed this recent reduction in the volatility
of long rates. Indeed, Chairman Greenspan has referred to the stability of the long rate in
the presence of a variable short rate during this period a conundrum. Moreover, Rudebusch,
Swanson, and Wu (2006) also mention the reduction in the volatility of long rates in recent
data.
We summarize these observations as
Fact 1. Pre World-War II, long rates are stable relative to short rates in many coun-
tries. Post World-War II, long rates are volatile relative to short rates in those same coun-
tries. After 1990, in the United States, long rates are stable again relative to short rates.
We now turn to our second fact.
Fact 2. The risk premium on long bonds moves more than one for one with the yield
spread.
Our second fact concerns the comovement of interest rates and risk. There is a large
empirical literature in ﬁnance that ﬁnds that movements in the spread between long and
short yields forecasts movements in the returns earned by investors who buy a long bond and
hold it for one year relative to the return that investors would earn at the risk free interest
rate for that year. We call this diﬀerence in returns the excess return on long bonds and the
expected value of this excess return the risk premium on long bonds. What we emphasize
here is the empirical magnitude of this relationship between the yield spread and the risk
premium on long term bonds – the risk premium on long bonds moves more than one for
one with the yield spread.
We use the following notation to describe these empirical results more precisely. Let
Pk
t denote the price in period t of a zero-coupon bond that pays oﬀ one dollar in period
t + k and let pk
t =l o gPk





t and the (log) excess return to holding this bond over the short bond is
rk
xt+1 = rk
t+1 − it.T h e risk premium on long bonds is the expected excess return Etrk
xt+1.
Many authors have run return forecasting regressions of excess returns against the yield










Note that under the hypothesis that the risk premia on long bonds are constant over time, the
slope coeﬃcient β
k in this regression should be zero. In the data, however, these regressions
yield estimates of β
k that are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero with point estimates typically
greater than 1 for moderate to large k.
We emphasize the magnitude of this slope coeﬃcient here because these regression
results thus imply that the risk premium on long bonds moves more than one for one with
the yield spread. More precisely, note that a ﬁnding that the slope coeﬃcient β
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which, using simple algebra, implies that the variance in the risk premium on long bonds is
greater than the risk premium
Va r(Etr
k
xt+1) ≥ Va r(y
L
t − it). (4)
We illustrate this ﬁnding using the same data on bond yields from McCulloch and
Kwon (1991) and Gurkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2001) cited in Figure 1. Following the
literature, we set the holding period to be a year. One can run this return forecasting
regression for long bonds of any maturity. For simplicity, for the left-hand side variable we
use ¯ rxt+1 =
P13
k=2 rk
xt+1/12, that is, the average one-year holding period excess returns on
bonds of maturity 2 through 13, and for yL
t we use the yield on the 13 year bond for it we
use the yield on one-year zero coupon bonds. We estimate a slope coeﬃcient β =1 .97 in this
regression.
Regressions of the form of (2) have been run for 20 years, starting with the work of
Fama and Bliss (1987). (See also, Campbell and Shiller 1991, and Cochrane and Piazzesi
2005.) During this period there has been extensive discussion of how to compute standard
errors in this context. We choose not to report these errors here and refer the interested
reader to Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) for a discussion of the issues involved in evaluating
the signiﬁcance of these return forecasting regressions.
7One reason that we ﬁnd this second fact linking yield spread ﬂuctuations and risk
interesting for monetary policy analysis at business cycle frequencies is that the yield spread
roughly captures the movements in the monetary policy instrument, namely the short rate,
at those frequencies. In Figure 5 we show this by plotting the yield spread, as deﬁned in
Figure 1, together with the HP-ﬁltered short rate.
2. Modeling Long and Short Rates
In this section we consider the implications of standard monetary models for the joint
behavior of long and short term interest rates. Standard monetary models assume that all
risk premia on long term bonds are constant. As a result of this assumption, they imply
that all movements in the long rate correspond to movements in agents’ expectations of the
average of future short rates over the maturity of the long term bond. We review the ﬁnding
that this class of models cannot reproduce the data on the volatility of long yields relative
to short yields presented in Figures 1 and 2 if one maintains the assumption that the short
rate is stationary and ergodic. We argue that to reproduce the post World War II data on
the volatility on long rates relative to short rates in this class of models, one must assume
that most of the movements in short rates are expected to be extremely persistent.
We then consider whether one might account for the volatility of long rates documented
in Figure 1 as arising from large and persistent movements in term premia in long rates rather
than from large and persistent movements in agents’ expectations of the average of future
short term rates over the maturity of the long term bond. We argue that the empirical results
on bond risk premia in Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) indicate this hypothesis is unlikely to
hold. We conclude then that movements in long term yields in the post World War II period,
at least at low frequencies, are most likely accounted for by large and persistent movements
in agents’ expectations of short term interest rates.

























given by the two terms in brackets. The ﬁrst term is the average of the short term interest
rates expected over the next k periods. The second term is the diﬀerence between yield on
the riskless strategy of investing in the k period bond and holding it to maturity and the
8expected yield on the risky strategy of rolling over a sequence of one period investments in
the short term bond between period t and period t+k−1. We refer to the second component
as the term premium on the long yield.
In order to develop a theory of the term premium, it is useful to recast it in terms of
expectations of excess returns on a sequence of one-period investments in long-term bonds.
Using the deﬁnition that yk
t = −pk






















































Note that each of the terms in square brackets on the right hand side of this equation the
excess return on an investment in a long term bond. Having rewritten the term premium in
this way, and noting that r1
xt+1 =0 , we then have that long-term yields are equal to agents’
expectation of the average of the short-term rate over the life of the long term bond plus their


















Standard monetary models start with the assumption that all risk premia, and hence,
all expected excess returns Etrk
xt+1, are constant. As a result, these models imply that term
premia on long term bonds are constant and, thus, movements in long term yields correspond
exactly to movements in agents’ expectations of the average of the short rate over the life of
the long-term bond.
The simplest versions of these models also assume that the short rate is stationary and
ergodic. As we show next in Proposition 1, as a consequence, these simple models cannot
account for the large volatility of long rates relative to that of short rates observed in Figure
1.
Proposition 1. If the short rate it is stationary and ergodic and and expected excess
returns on long term bonds Etrk
xt+1 are constant, then the long term yield yk
t converges to a
constant ¯ y∞ independent of the date t as their maturity k grows to inﬁnity.
9Proof. The yield on a k-period bond at t can be written as (6). From our assumption
of ergodicity, as k grows to inﬁnity, the long-run average of future short rates expected at
date t converges to a constant independent of the date t. Q.E.D.
As this proposition makes clear, the prediction that long term yields should not be
volatile follows from a basic assumption that underlies a great many macroeconomic models.
Thus, the failure of standard monetary models to capture the volatility of long term yields
does not lie in the modeling details.2
Our proposition is based on an argument about long yields as their maturity gets large.
One might ask whether this result is relevant for the data on the long but ﬁnite yields that
we do observe. A long literature argues that it is. See, for example, Shiller (1979), Singleton
(1980), Leroy and Porter (1981), Backus and Zin (1993), and Fuhrer (1996) among many
others.
The key tension highlighted in this literature is that our basic assumptions about the
time series properties of the short rate chosen by the Fed are in conﬂict with the data on the
volatility of long rates that we observe. Standard models that assume that the short rate is
stationary and ergodic typically have the implication that averages of expectations of future
short rates converge to a constant too fast to account for the observed variability of long term
rates. This diﬃculty that standard models have in generating movements in long term yet
ﬁnite yields is easy to illustrate by way of an example. Assume that the short rate is an AR1
of the form
it+1 =( 1− ρ)¯ ı + ρit + εt+1.
and that expected excess returns are constant over time. Using (6) we have that
y
k





(it −¯ ı) (7)
2Those readers immersed in the literature on bond pricing may note that almost all models of bond pricing,
including those models that allow for a non-stationary short-term interest rate, have the implication that the
yield on long-term bonds, in the limit, is constant. This implication follows from an argument that if the
limiting yield, y∞
t , exists, then it cannot fall or else there would be an opportunity for arbitrage. See Dybvig,
Ingersoll, and Ross (1996) for details. Clearly, in the data, we have seen yields on 30 year bonds both rise and
fall so the theoretical arguments about restrictions on the limiting yield y∞
t do not apply to the long-term
yields that we do observe. Hence, the substantive empirical question regards the implications of our models
for long yet ﬁnite yields.
10This example is presented in Backus and Zin (1993). (Also note that Fama and Bliss (1987)
assume that the short rate follows an AR1 in their empirical work.) Using monthly data on
the 3-month TBill rate in Figure 1 we estimate ρ t ob e. 9 8 6 .F o ra1 3y e a rz e r oc o u p o nb o n d
in monthly data, k = 156, and (7) reduces to
y
k
t − ¯ y = .41(it −¯ ı) (8)





which is considerably smaller than the corresponding ratio of .98 that we reported earlier for
as similar period (1946:12 to 1989:12).
The diﬃculty that this simple model has in accounting for the volatility of long rates
grows as we consider longer term rates. For example, for a 23 year zero coupon bond in
monthly data, k = 276 and (7) reduces to
y
k
t − ¯ y = .25(it −¯ ı)
while for a 30 year zero coupon bond, k =3 6 0and (7) reduces to
y
k
t − ¯ y = .20(it −¯ ı)
Because of the geometric mean reversion of the short rate, this simple model implies lower
and lower volatility of long rates as the maturity grows. As a result, this simple example will
also fail to reproduce the observation in Figure 2 that yields of 13, 23, and 30 year maturities
are all quite similar.
In the ﬁnance literature, empirical researchers looking to model the behavior of both
short and long-term yields in the data from the past 50 years have begun to consider models
in which the short-term interest rate is non-stationary or has a very persistent, if not quite
permanent, component. See, for example, Backus and Zin (1993), Kozicki and Tinsley (2001)
and Fama (2006). If the short rate is non-stationary3,t h e nav a r i e t yo ft i m es e r i e sm e t h o d s
3Technically, there are theoretical problems of assuming that there is literally a nontrivial martingale
component to the short rate. (See, for example, Campbell, Lo, McKinley 1997 for details.) Here we are
thinking of assuming that the short rate has a random walk component only as a way of approximating a
very persistent short rate series.
11provide a decomposition of the short rate into a random walk component (or more generally
a martingale component) which we denote ¯ ıt and a stationary component ˆ ıt,w i t hit =¯ ıt +ˆ ıt.
Given such a time series decomposition of the short rate, we then have the following
proposition.
Proposition 2. Decompose the short rate it into a martingale component ¯ ıt and a sta-
tionary component ˆ ıt. Assume that the stationary component ˆ ıt is ergodic and that expected
excess returns on all long term bonds Etrk
xt+1 for k ≥ 1 are constant. Then the yield on long
term bonds converges to ¯ ıt plus a constant independent of t as their maturity k grows to
inﬁnity.
















The result follows from the fact that Et¯ ıt+s =¯ ıt and the ergodicity of ˆ ıt. Q.E.D.
Given this proposition, our data on long-term yields in ﬁgure 1 thus suggest that the
martingale component of the short rate accounts for most of the total ﬂuctuations in the
short rate over the past 50 years.
The long historical data on the volatility of long term yields and the short term interest
rate suggest that an improved understanding of how the public forms expectations of the
long term course of monetary policy may also yield a resolution of Greenspan’s conundrum
regarding the stability of long term yields in the face of continued volatility of the short term
interest rate. Speciﬁcally, if the public has come to perceive movements in short term interest
rate over the past ten years or so as stationary and ergodic as opposed to non-stationary, then
it would be quite natural for long term yields to be stable in the face of large swings in the
short term rate. See the conclusion in Rudebusch, Swanson, and Wu (2006) for a discussion
of this hypothesis.
Throughout this discussion we have assumed that the term premium on long term
yields is constant and used that assumption to discuss the relation between long yields and
expectations of averages of future short rates. We now consider the alternative hypothesis
that the large and persistent movements in long yields that we observe in Figure 1 might be
accounted for by large and persistent movements in term premia.
12Empirical work in ﬁnance argues that the expected excess returns to holding long term
bonds varies over time and, as a result, from (6) the term premium should also vary over
time. To argue that there are large and persistent movements in the term premium, however,
one must argue that there are large and persistent movements in agents’ expectations of long








We argue that such large and persistent movements in averages of expected excess returns
are likely not there in the data.
Our argument is based on the work of Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005), who study the
expected excess returns to holding long term bonds. Cochrane and Piazzesi ﬁnd that annual
excess returns on long term bonds of maturity k can all be forecast with a single linear
combination of yields at t.S p e c i ﬁcally, using data on annual holding period returns, they

















across maturities k and argue that these regressions are we l ls u m m a r i z e db yar e s t r i c t e ds e t
of regressions of the form
r
k
xt+1 = αk + bkxt











With this empirical summary of expected excess returns on long-term bonds, then the term















T h eq u e s t i o no fw h e t h e rﬂuctuations in the term premium can account for much of the
ﬂuctuations in the yields of long term bonds then comes down to an analysis of whether
there are large and persistent movements in these weighted average of expected values of the
returns forecasting factor xt over time. Note that if the series xt is stationary and ergodic,
13then we would not expect to see large and persistent swings in this measure of the term
premium since these weighted averages of expectations of future values of xt should converge
to a constant independent of the date t.
Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) plot the time series for the return forecasting factor xt.
One can see in that ﬁgure that this return forecasting factor appears to bounce around a
relatively constant mean, suggesting the series xt does not have persistent movements and







should converge to a constant as k grows.
We now examine this idea more precisely. We use the results in Cochrane and Piazzesi
(2005) to construct an estimate of the term premium on the 13 year zero coupon yield as
follows. We estimate the autocorrelation of their estimate of xt in annual data to be ρ =0 .26.
We use this autocorrelation to estimate the terms
Etxt+s = ρ
sxt (11)
We use their estimates of the regression slopes bk−s for returns on bonds with maturities
k =2 ,3,4,5 and we use their linear method to extrapolate the regressions coeﬃcients for
k =6 ,...,13. We then plug the following values of bk to estimate the term premium on the


















b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 b9 b10 b11 b12 b13
0.47 0.87 1.24 1.43 1.82 2.15 2.47 2.80 3.13 3.45 3.78 4.11
We set the constant here so that our estimate of the average term premium in the
sample equals the average diﬀerence between the 13 year yield and the one year yield in the
sample.
Note that this procedure gives an estimate of the term premium whose ﬂuctuations
are simply a scalar times xt and hence it also does not have persistent movements unless
xt does. In Figure 6 we show the 13 year yield and our estimate of agent’s expectations of
14the average of the short term interest rate over the next 13 years given by subtracting this
estimate of the term premium from the observed 13 year yield. While it is clear that the
term premium may ﬂuctuate in important ways at higher frequencies, it is also clear from
this ﬁgure that ﬂuctuations in the term premium do not account for the large and persistent
movements in the 13 year yield that we have seen in the post World War II data.
Cochrane and Piazzesi (2008) are developing a much more sophisticated analysis of
the dynamics of term premia and we look forward to learning about their improvements on
our simple approximation based on (11).
3. Time-Varying Risk
A large body of empirical work in ﬁnance ﬁnds evidence time-varying risk premia in
the expected excess returns on investments in stocks, long term bonds, and foreign currency
denominated bonds. This evidence has had a large impact on work in ﬁnance as illustrated
by the following quote.
Overall, the new view of ﬁnance amounts to a profound change. We have to get
used to the fact that most returns and price variation comes from variation in
risk premia. (Cochrane 2001, p. 451)
Cochrane’s observation directs our attention to a critical counterfactual assumption of the
standard general equilibrium monetary model: constant risk premia. We now argue that
this failure of standard monetary models to capture movements in risk premia is not a detail
that can reasonably be abstracted from when analyzing the impact of monetary policy on
the economy. Instead, it is a central problem in terms of using standard models to derive
implications for the comovements of the short term interest rate and other macroeconomic
aggregates. This is because the evidence in ﬁnance indicates that movements in risk premia
are highly correlated with movements in the short rate at business cycle frequencies and are
at least as large as these movements in the short rate itself.
Consider ﬁrst the link between the short rate and macroeconomic aggregates built
into standard monetary models. We begin with representative agent models. The short
term nominal interest rate enters standard representative consumer models through an Euler











where it is the logarithm of the short term nominal interest rate 1+it, β and Uct are the
discount factor and the marginal utility of the representative consumer, and πt+1 is the
inﬂation rate. Analysts then commonly assume that the data are well-approximated by a





















The critical question in monetary policy analysis is what terms on the right hand side
of (13) change when the monetary authority changes the interest rate it. The traditional
assumption is that conditional variances are constant, so that the second term in (13) is
constant. This leaves the familiar version of the Euler equation:
it = −Et log
Uct+1
Uct
+ Et logπt+1 + constant. (14)
Thus, by assumption, standard monetary models imply that movements in the short term
nominal interest rate are associated one-for-one with the sum of the movements in the ex-
pected growth of the log of marginal utility for the representative consumer and expected
inﬂation. The debate in the literature on the eﬀects of monetary policy might be summa-
rized roughly as a debate over how much of the movement in the short term interest rate is
reﬂected in the expected growth of the log of marginal utility of consumption (representing a
real eﬀect of monetary policy) and how much of the movement is reﬂe c t e di ne x p e c t e dl o gi n -
ﬂation (representing a nominal eﬀect of monetary policy). The answer to this question in the
context of a speciﬁc model depends on the speciﬁcation of the other equations of the model.
However, virtually universally, the possibility that movements in the short term interest rate
might be associated with changes in the conditional variances of these variables is ruled out
by assumption.
We have described the standard approach in the context of a model with a represen-
tative consumer. Our discussion also applies to more general models which do not assume
ar e p r e s e n t a t i v ec o n s u m e r . T os e et h i sn o t et h a tw ec a nw r i t ee q u a t i o n s( 1 2 ) - ( 1 4 )m o r e
abstractly in terms of a nominal pricing kernel (or stochastic discount factor) mt+1 as
exp(−it)=Etmt+1. (15)
16In a model with a representative agent this pricing kernel is given by mt+1 = βUct+1/(Uctπt+1)
and (15) is the representative agent’s ﬁrst order condition for optimal bond holdings. In some
segmented market models (15) is ﬁrst order condition for the subset of agents who actually
participate in the bond market while in others (15) is no single agent’s ﬁrst order condition.
In general equation (15) is implied by lack of arbitrage possibilities in ﬁnancial market.
Using conditional log-normality (15) implies




and with constant conditional variances we have
it = −Et logmt+1 + constant. (17)
Thus the more general assumption made in the literature is that movements in the short term
interest rate are associated with movements in the conditional mean of the log of the pricing
kernel and not with movements in its conditional variance.
It is clear that standard monetary models with constant conditional variances are
inconsistent with the evidence from ﬁnance of time-varying risk premia. Is this a serious
problem if we want to use these models to understand what in the macroeconomy moves
when the short rate moves? We argue that the answer to this question is yes.
To begin to address this question, consider ﬁrst what aspects of the comovements of
the short rate and macroeconomic aggregates that we miss in the Euler equation of standard






are too smooth relative to the short rate at business cycle frequencies so they account for
virtually none of the ﬂuctuations in the policy variable, the short rate, at these frequencies. To
illustrate this point, we4 have estimated a version of the Smets Wouters (2007) model with
4Actually, we asked Ellen McGrattan to reestimate the model using codes kindly provided by Smets and
Wouters and she kindly obliged. A similar remark applies later to the computations underlying Figures 10
and 11.
17standard CRRA preferences and computed the errors in the consumption Euler equation,
where the error is computed as








In Figure 7, we plot the HP ﬁltered short term interest rate from the model (the Fed
Funds Rate) and the HP ﬁltered error in the Euler equation. We ﬁnd this ﬁgure striking.
As we have explained, in theory the standard monetary models imply that movements in the
short rate are associated one-for-one with the sum of the movements in the expected growth
of the log of marginal utility for the representative consumer and expected inﬂation. Figure
7 shows that, in practice in a standard monetary model, movements in the short rate are
associated almost one-for-one with Euler equation error and the model captures essentially
none of the link between the short rate and the macroeconomy. Since this Euler equation is
the fundamental link between monetary policy and the macroeconomy, the standard model
can hardly be said to be useful for analyzing monetary policy at business cycle frequencies if
the observed movements in the monetary policy instrument at these frequencies correspond
simply to the unexplained error in this equation.
What is this Euler equation error that moves with the short rate at business cycle
frequencies? In previous work (Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe 2007), we used data on US and
foreign currency denominated interest rates and exchange rates to argue that these errors
correspond to movements in risk premia. More speciﬁcally, we argued that what the standard
monetary model misses is large ﬂuctuations in the conditional variance of the pricing kernel.





t + et+1 − et − it
denote the (log) excess return on a foreign short bond with rate i∗
t where et is the log of
the exchange rate. Regressions of the excess return on an investment in the foreign currency
bond on the interest diﬀerential of the form
r
∗
xt+1 = a + b(i
∗
t − it)+ut+1. (18)
yield estimates of b greater than one. Deﬁning the risk premium on foreign bonds as Etr∗
xt+1,
note that if risk premia were constant, then this regression should yield a slope coeﬃcient
18estimate of zero. The ﬁnding that these regressions have a slope coeﬃcient greater than one























This ﬁnding has immediate implications for the conditional means and the conditional
variances of pricing kernels. To see this observe that lack of arbitrage in complete ﬁnancial
markets implies that
et+1 − et =l o gm
∗
t+1 − logmt+1. (19)










t+1 − vart logmt+1
i
. (20)
Thus the regression evidence implies that this diﬀerence of conditional variances moves more















t − it). (21)











t − it). (22)
Equations (21) and (22) make precise the sense in which risk premia at least as much as
interest diﬀerentials when these interest diﬀerentials move.
We ﬁnd the data on risk premia on foreign currency bonds particularly informative
about the comovements of the short rate and the pricing kernel because the relation (19)
directly links pricing kernels to exchange rates realization by realization. This tight link
allows us to identify movements in foreign currency risk premia with movements in conditional
variances in the pricing kernel with minimal assumptions.
19T h ed a t ao nt i m e - v a r i a t i o ni nr i s kp r e m i ao nl o n gt e r mb o n d si nF a c t2a l s oh a v e
implications for movements in the conditional variances of the pricing kernel. While this link
is suggestive, it is less direct because we have no analog of (19) that links observables to
movements in the pricing kernel realization by realization. We explore this link here.
To do so, consider a time series process for the level of the marginal utility of a dollar






where λ0 is the multiplier on the period 0 budget constraint. This marginal utility of a dollar
is directly proportional to the date zero price of a dollar delivered at date t in state st (with
notation for the state suppressed) divided by the unconditional probability of that state being









t =l o gEtQt+k − logQt. (23)
We now examine the relationship between excess holding period returns for bonds of
diﬀerent maturities and the conditional moments of the pricing kernel. While we assume that
Qt+1 is conditionally lognormal, we do not assume that Qt+k is conditionally log-normal for
k>1 conditional on information in period t since we allow for random variances. Instead we
assume that the conditional expectation Et+1Qt+k is itself conditionally lognormally distrib-
uted given information available in period t (as would be the case in an aﬃne model of the
pricing kernel). We prove the following proposition in the appendix.











20Note that this expression for the risk premium on long term bonds links excess returns
to the conditional variance of the pricing kernel in a manner somewhat analogous to that in
expression (20)
Expression (24) implies that expected excess returns on long bonds depends on two
types of uncertainty. The ﬁrst, that we refer to as short run risk, is uncertainty at time t
about how news at time t+1will aﬀect the price of a dollar at t+1, namely Qt+1. The second,
that we refer to as long run risk, is uncertainty at time t of how news at time t+1aﬀects the
expected price of a dollar at time t+k,n a m e l yEt+1Qt+k. Intuitively, an increase in short run
risk raises the risk premium on long term bonds because this increase raises the uncertainty
faced by an investor planning on selling a long term bond at t +1 . Correspondingly, an
increase in long run risk lowers the risk premium on long bonds because these bonds are a
hedge against long run risk, so investors require a lower expected return to hold them.
If we assume that short run and long run risk both increase when the yield spread













t − it) ≥ 0,
then we can show that the conditional variance of the pricing kernel moves more than one-
for-one with the yield spread. We demonstrate this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 4: Assume that short run and long run risk both increase when the






t − it) ≥ var(y
L
t − it). (25)



















t − it). (26)
21Under the assumption that short run and long run risk both increase when the yield spread
increases both covariances on the right side of (26) are positive. Hence, (3) implies (25).
Q.E.D
In the appendix we present an example of an aﬃne pricing kernel that satisﬁes the
assumptions of proposition 4. This example also captures the main mechanisms generating
time varying risk premia in the segmented markets model of Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe
(2007).
To summarize, on the basis of this evidence of time varying risk premia on foreign
currency and long term bonds, we argue that the movements in the short rate that are
missed by standard monetary models, that is, the Euler equation errors, shown in Figure 7
are likely movements in the conditional variance of the log of the pricing kernel.
4. Implications for Monetary Economics
We have presented two stylized facts – one about the low frequency behavior of
interest rates and one about their behavior at business cycle frequencies.
At low frequencies we see two regimes, a stable regime in which agents have stable long
term expectations of future short rates and a volatile regime in which agents have volatile long
term expectations of future short rates. The stable regime was in place in many countries
for over 100 years prior to World War II. After World War II these countries switched to
the volatile regime as early as the 1950s. Finally, data post 1990 suggests that at least the
United States has switched back to a stable regime.
At business cycle frequencies in postwar data we see that it is mainly risk that moves
when the short rate moves. We argued using both data on international interest diﬀerentials
and on yield spreads that this movement in risk corresponds to movements in the conditional
variance of pricing kernels.
New approaches to analyzing monetary policy are needed to confront these two stylized
facts.
We begin with a discussion of the central questions that should shape the long term
research agenda in monetary economics. We then discussion some immediate steps researchers
should take with their current frameworks.
22A. A Long Term Research Agenda
Consider ﬁrst the low frequency evidence on the changing volatility of agents’ long
run expectations of future short rates. If we step back from day-to-day analysis of monetary
policy, we see that low frequency data raise a fundamental question: After 100 years of
stability why did so many countries enter a volatile regime after World War II? The existing
literature has not answered this question.
The literature has oﬀered two basic approaches to modeling the volatile regime in
postwar U.S. data. The ﬁrst approach is mechanically describes the aspects of Fed policy
over this period that may have made the regime volatile. The second approach looks to
explicitly model the Fed’s objectives and information that led to its volatile behavior.
We begin by discussing several prominent examples of this ﬁrst approach. Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler (2000) QJE estimate Taylor rules using postwar data and argue that, for
at least a portion of this period, the Fed’s reaction function led to highly variable inﬂation.
Given that the short rate is stationary and ergodic under the policy regime that leads to a
unique equilibrium in this paper, we strongly suspect that this model cannot generate the
observed movements in the long rate observed in this period. It is not clear how to compute
this model’s implications for the long rate under the policy regime that allows for multiple
equilibria. Hence it is not evident that this model can confront the evidence of volatility in
agents’ long term expectations.
Next, Sims and Zha (2005) also estimate a Taylor rule allowing for multiple regimes
both for the coeﬃcients in the rule and the processes on the shocks. In Figure 8 we plot their
model’s implications for the expectations of the average of the short rate over a 13 year and
30 year horizon. (This ﬁgure is not yet available).
Finally, a branch of literature in this approach explicitly uses data on long rates to
help estimate the Fed’s choice for short rates. (See, for example, Ang, Dong, and Piazzesi
2007, Bekaert, Cho, and Moreno 2006, Rudebusch and Wu 2005, and Gallemeyer, Holliﬁeld,
and Zin 2005) This work is clearly useful for many questions and represents a step forward
in integrating important information in long yields into the study of monetary policy.
None of these examples of the ﬁrst approach, however, address the fundamental ques-
tion of why a central bank would choose policy in such a way that agents would have such
23volatile expectations of its average choice of its short rate over the long run.
We turn now to several prominent examples of the second approach. Orphanides
(2002) argues that the Fed’s diﬃculties in interpreting real time economic data in the 1970s
played a key role in shaping the Fed’s choice of the short rate during that time. It is unclear,
however, what mechanism in this framework would lead to persistent movements in agents’
expectations of future policy. Thus, we do not see how an explanation of this sort would be
able to account for the volatility in agents expectations of the Fed’s average choice of short
rates in the long run.
Sargent, Williams, and Zha (2005) and Primiceri (2006) represent the most ambitious
attempts to reconcile the observed low frequency movements in Fed policy with optimizing
behavior by the Fed. In these papers the Fed uses a misspeciﬁed model to choose policy
and continually revises that model in light of the data. This approach is clearly aimed
at fundamental questions in analysis of monetary policy in the post World War II period.
Unfortunately, however, data on long rates pose a formidable challenge to models of this
type. The basic problem is these models have a very diﬃcult time generating volatile long
run expectations simply from learning dynamics. To illustrate this point we graph in Figure 9
the time series for long run averages of expected inﬂation over horizons of 20 and 30 years from
the model of Sargent, Williams, and Zha (2005) together with the data on the 13 year and
the 23 year zero coupon yield. (Tao Zha kindly provided us with these long run expectations
of inﬂation from the Sargent, Williams, and Zha model.)
Now consider our second stylized fact. If we are interested in the analysis of monetary
policy at business cycle frequencies we need to deal with a fundamental issue: Since most of
the movements in the short rate at business cycle are movements in risk, how do we introduce
time-varying risk into our monetary models?
We see two basic approaches one might take to introduce such risk. One approach,
termed the exogenous risk approach, models time-varying risk as an exogenous feature of
the real economy that the Fed passively accommodates in setting policy. McCallum (1994)
is a prominent early proponent of such an approach. The second approach, termed the
endogenous risk approach, models the Fed as an active player in generating this time-varying
risk. Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2002 and 2007) propose such an approach. Clearly, before
24progress can be made in modelling it is essential to sort out which way the causality runs:
from risk to the Fed or from the Fed to risk.
The exogenous risk approach suggests a new view of monetary policy. Under it the
Fed must continually adjust the short term nominal interest rate in response to time variation
in risk even if the sole objective of the central bank is to maintain a constant level of ex-
pected inﬂation. To illustrate this view, consider a simple, constant-velocity cash-in-advance
model in which aggregate consumption follows an exogenously given stochastic process so
that monetary policy aﬀects only nominal variables. As in Campbell and Cochrane (1999)
or Bansal and Yaron (2004), assume that, corresponding to this exogenously given stochastic
process for consumption, the log of the marginal utility of consumption of the representative
consumer follows an exogenously given stochastic process with a time-varying conditional
mean and variance. In such a model the Euler equation (13) clearly implies that the Fed
must adjust the short rate it to accommodate movements in conditional variances if it is to
keep the conditional means of inﬂation and the growth of the marginal utility of consumption
constant.
Under this interpretation the Euler equation errors shown in Figure 7 are simply the
result of the Fed adjusting the short rate to accommodate exogenous shocks to risk that
would otherwise cause ﬂuctuations in either consumption growth or inﬂation. Put simply,
the Euler equation implies that the volatility in risk has to show up somewhere: either in
the short rate or in the expected growth of consumption and inﬂation. Under this view, the
outcome that we observe is one in which the Fed soaks up this volatility in risk in the short
rate so as to avoid having it show up in consumption and inﬂation.
The endogenous risk approach also suggests a new view of monetary policy. Under it
we see a weak link at business cycle frequencies between ﬂuctuations in the short rate and
expected consumption growth (of aggregate consumption) and inﬂation. That model has
heterogeneous agents with some in and some out of the asset market. Hence, in that model
there is no Euler equation of the form (13) linking aggregate consumption and inﬂation to
interest rates. (See Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe 2002 and 2007 for details.) Instead, the
pricing kernel is formed from the marginal utilities of the marginal investor at each date
and state of nature. Thus, errors in a representative agent version of the Euler equation
25correspond to gaps between aggregate consumption and the marginal utility of consumption
of the marginal investor.
Either of these approaches will lead to a quantitatively nontrivial reassessment of
Taylor rules as descriptions of policy. (See, for example, Ang, Dong, and Piazzesi 2007.)
Since McCallum (1994) a large literature have studied pure exchange economies with
exogenous time-varying risk. Examples include Wachter (2006) who uses habit persistence,
Bansal and Shaliastovich (2007), Gallmeyer, Holliﬁeld, Palomino, and Zin (2007) who use
Epstein-Zin preferences with time-varying variances of consumption. Alvarez, Atkeson, and
Kehoe (2002 and 2007) study a pure exchange economy with endogenous time-varying risk
arising from endogenously segmented asset markets. Incorporating production in these mod-
els has proved challenging, if not daunting. (See, for example, Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher
2001 and Uhlig 2007.)
B. Immediate Recommendations
Developing the agenda above is a long term project because it will require developing
new models. Here we discuss two shorter term steps that are within the current frontier that
represent an improvement over current practice.
First, researchers should explicitly incorporate long term interest rates into their mone-
tary business cycle models to ensure that they capture changes in agents’s expectations about
the long run course of policy. Second, researchers should not simply stick exotic preferences
from ﬁnance into an otherwise standard model in the hope that this will capture time-varying
risk.
Cogley and Sbordone (2005) and Ireland (2007) nicely illustrate why it is critical to
capture changes in agents’ expectations about the long run course of policy in applied settings.
As is well-known inﬂation is very persistent in the U.S. data. As we have shown agents expect
the short rate to be very persistent as well. Standard models fail to capture the persistence
of policy and hence regard the persistence of inﬂation as a puzzle. A popular way to make a
model with nonpersistent generate persistent inﬂation is to mechanically assume that prices
are backward indexed. (See, for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 2005 and
Smets and Wouters 2007.) Cogley and Sbordone (2005) and Ireland (2007) ﬁnd that once the
26persistence of policy is properly accounted for the model matches the persistence of inﬂation
even when there is no backward indexation and it ﬁtd e t e r i o r a t e si fb a c k w a r di n d e x a t i o ni s
included. Distinguishing between the two ways of generating persistence is critical because
the costs of disinﬂation are large if the persistence is coming from backward indexation
and the costs are trivial if the persistence is coming from policy. Indeed, as Chari, Kehoe,
and McGrattan (2008) stress if the persistence is actually coming from policy and not from
backward indexation then the policy advice from a model in which it is mechanically assumed
to be coming from backward indexation is not useful.
For some interesting preliminary work in explicitly modeling the term structure in a
New Keynesian model see Bekaert, Cho, and Moreno (2006).
Next, we illustrate the diﬃculties that arise from simply sticking exotic preferences
popular in ﬁnance into otherwise standard macroeconomics models with the hope that doing
so will improve results when the model is estimated on U.S. data. We are very skeptical
that this approach will lead to a step forward in our modeling of monetary policy and the
economy.
To understand our skepticism consider the model of Smets and Wouters (2007) that
is widely regarded as the state-of-the-art monetary model. This model incorporates external
habit persistence in consumption in the representative agent’s utility function. In evaluating
t h er o l eo fh a b i tp e r s i s t e n c ei nt h i sm o d e lw eﬁnd it useful to the log-linearized Euler equation
of the form (14) in which the constant term has been replaced by the error in the Euler
equation εbt as in
it = −Et log
Uct+1
Uct
+ Et logπt+1 + εbt. (27)
The term it is given in data by the Fed funds rate. A time series for the conditional means




+ Et logπt+1 (28)
on the right side of (27) can be computed from the data using the model to compute the
conditional expectations at each date. In a slight abuse of terminology we refer to the terms
in (28) as the predicted short rate.
27In Figure 10 we plot the Smets and Wouters (2007) data on the Fed funds rate together
with their model’s predicted short rate using their estimated level of habit persistence. As is
clear from the ﬁgure the model’s prediction for the short rate is simply wild: it is extremely
volatile and has little or no relation to the actual short rate.
We now show that the model’s extreme predictions for the short rate come entirely
from the inclusion of habit in consumer preferences. To do so we reestimated the model
imposing that the habit parameter is zero. In Figure 11 we plot the same data on the Fed
funds rate along with the model’s predicted short rate under this speciﬁcation. Here the
predicted short rate does a much better job of tracking the actual short rate. In this sense,
including at least this form of exotic preferences clearly does not represent progress.
5. Conclusion
What have put forward two stylized facts about the behavior of interest rates and
argued that these facts call for a new approach to analyzing monetary policy.
We have argued that the low frequency data on long and short rates indicates that
there has been a remarkable shift in the volatility of agents’ expectations of long run averages
of the future short rate. In the pre World War II data, it appears that agents had very stable
expectations about the path of the short rate on average over the long term. After World
War II, it appears that agents’ long run expectations became unanchored – it appears
that agents interpreted most of the high frequency movements in the short rate as nearly
permanent changes in policy. More recently, in the data after 1990, it appears that agents’
long run expectations may be ﬁnding an anchor again.
A central question in the analysis of monetary policy at low frequencies then is what
institutional changes led to this pattern. To answer this question at a mechanical level, we see
that the Gold Standard was the main institution governing monetary policy in the pre-war
era and that after the war most countries switched to a ﬁat standard governed for part of
the time by the Bretton Woods agreement. But this answer is, at best, a superﬁcial one. In
the pre war era, countries chose to be on the Gold Standard for the majority of the time and
chose to leave it when it suited their purposes. Thus, the relevant question is what forces
at a deeper level led agents to have conﬁdence that their governments would choose stable
28policy over the long term, what forces led them to lose this conﬁdence after World War II,
and ﬁnally what forces led them to gain it again in the 1990s. Only if we can quantitatively
account for this history can we give advice on how to avoid another Great Inﬂation.
This question is particularly relevant given the recent conﬂi c ta tt h eF e db e t w e e n
ﬁghting rising inﬂation and stimulating a potentially stagnating economy. In our hurry to
moderate the current economic dip are we unhinging long-term expectations from their long-
term anchor?
We have argued that at business cycle frequencies, most of the movements in the short
rate correspond to movements in risk, rather than to movements in the expected growth of
marginal utility and inﬂation as assumed in the standard models. This fact gives us a new
perspective as to what moves in the macro-economy when the interest rate moves.
A central question in the analysis of monetary policy at business cycle frequencies is
what is the direction of causation? Is the Fed reacting passively to real risks in the economy
or is the Fed itself causing some of this risk? Until we answer this question we can’t answer
the key counterfactual questions like what would happen if the Fed changed policy.
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Proof of Proposition 3







t = Et logEt+1Qt+k − Et logQt+1 − (logEtQt+k − logQt).
where the second equality follows from (23). Using conditional log-normality one-step ahead,
the short-term interest rate is given by
it = −Et (logQt+1 − logQt) −
1
2
vart (logQt+1 − logQt). (29)







vart (logQt+1 − logQt)+( Et logEt+1Qt+k − logEtQt+k). (30)
Consider next the term
Et logEt+1Qt+k − logEtQt+k
in (30). Note that Et+1Qt+k is random as of period t and, by the Law of Iterated Expectations,
EtQt+k is the conditional expectation of this random variable given information at time t.
Thus, since the function log is strictly concave, we have in general
Et logEt+1Qt+k < logEtQt+k.
The magnitude of the diﬀerence between these two quantities is typically increasing in the
variance of Et+1Qt+k. Thus, all else equal, the more uncertainty there is about the conditional
expectation Et+1Qt+k, the lower is the expected excess holding period return to a long term
bond. With our assumption that the conditional expectation Et+1Qt+k is itself conditionally
lognormally distributed given information available in period t,w eh a v e
Et logEt+1Qt+k =l o gEtQt+k −
1
2
Va r t logEt+1Qt+k
This gives the result. Q.E.D.
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Aﬃne pricing kernel example that satisﬁes assumptions of proposition 4
Here we present the “negative" Cox-Ingersoll-Ross from Backus, Foresi, Mozumdar, and Wu
(2001). In aﬃne models of bond prices, bond prices p
k−1
t+1 are linear functions of a state vector
zt+1 that is conditionally log normally distributed with possibly heteroskedastic innovations
and the pricing kernel logmt+1 is hit by the same innovations.
In our example, we have a process for the single state variable
zt+1 =( 1− ϕ)θ + ϕzt + σz
1/2
t  t+1
and the pricing kernel given by




with 0 <ϕ<1, (1 − ϕ)θ>σ 2/2 and  t+1 a standard normal innovation. The conditional
variance of innovations to both the state zt+1 and the pricing kernel logmt+1 varies with the






In this model, bond prices are linear functions of the state given by
p
k
t = −Ak − Bkzt
where Ak and Bk are deﬁned by the recursion
Ak+1 = δ + Ak + Bk(1 − ϕ)θ
Bk+1 = −1+λ
2/2+Bkϕ − (λ + Bkσ)
2/2
starting with A0 = B0 =0 .N o t e t h a t s i n c e A1 = δ and B1 = −1, the short rate in this
model is given by it = δ − zt.






t+1 =l o gEt+1Qt+k − logQt+1
and, in standard notation
logmt+1 =l o gQt+1 − logQt
we have









t+1 +l o gmt+1 =
−Ak−1 − Bk−1
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Gathering terms in  t+1 gives




t+1 +l o gmt+1
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=( Bk−1σ + λ)
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2 − (Bk−1σ + λ)
2i
zt
The slope of the regression coeﬃcient of expected excess returns for a bond of maturity






2 − (Bk−1σ + λ)
2i
−BL/L +1
where the expression in the denominator is the yield spread yL
t − it as a function of zt.I fw e
set the persistence of the state ϕ = .99, the constant δ = .05/12 (5% on a monthly basis),
λ =
√
2,a n dσ =0 .0088, and use the 13 year zero coupon yield for yL
t , we get regression
slopes greater than one for long yields and both short and long term risk rise when the yield
spread rises. This is veriﬁed because Bkσ converges to −.43 for large k so that Bkσ +λ>0.
Note that when λ =
√
2, then the conditional mean of the pricing kernel is constant
and all movements in the term spread are movements in the conditional variance just as
discussed in Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2007).
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13 year yield 3 month - 13 year differential 3 month T-BillFigure 2:






























































































































































23 year yield 13 year yield 30 year yieldFigure 3: 



























































































































































Fed Funds Target 3 month T-BillFigure 4A:




























































































































































































3 month commercial paper Long-term bond yieldFigure 4B:




































































































































































































private discount rate 2.5% consol yieldFigure 4C:
























































































































































































































































Private Discount Rate (1860-1914) 3 month T-bill (1960-2007) 10 year government bondFigure 4D: 





























































































































































































Berlin Discount Rate (1860-1914) 3 month T-bill (1953-2007) 10 year government bondFigure 4E: 





























































































































































































Private Discount Rate (1860-1914) 3 month T-Bill (1946-2007) 10 year government bondFigure 5:








































































































































































3 month - 13 year differential HP filtered 3 month T-BillFigure 6: Movements of 13 year yield and 






















































































































































































































































































































HP filtered Fed Funds Rate HP Filtered Euler ErrorFigure 9: Sargent-Williams-Zha expectations of 20 and 30 year average inflation 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fed Funds Rate Predicted Rate